INTRODUCTION {#S5}
============

By early June 2020, 25 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had each reported over 1,000 cases of COVID-19.^[@R1]^ SSA is projected to have a lower infection fatality ratio due to its relatively young population.^[@R2]^ However, the region may be at risk of severe epidemics due to high urban density, limited opportunities for physical distancing, and poor access to hygiene interventions.^[@R3]^ The existing public health infrastructure for epidemic response in SSA is also of concern: testing capacity, surveillance infrastructure, isolation facilities, and intensive care (ICU) services are sparse.^[@R4],[@R5]^

In the midst of these formidable concerns, low and middle-income countries (LMICs) are implementing epidemic control programs. The World Health Organization (WHO) suggests an array of measures, including disease surveillance platforms, contact tracing, and establishment of isolation facilities.^[@R6]^ The ability of these measures to limit transmission of communicable diseases has been evaluated in epidemiologic models, which have shown that their efficacy depends on intervention adherence and transmission dynamics.^[@R7],[@R8]^ Yet few studies have examined these strategies with the consideration of costs, to enable estimation of their cost- effectiveness and feasibility. Limitations in human resources, public health financing, and healthcare facility availability necessitate careful attention to these issues in LMICs.

We used a dynamic microsimulation model to compare medical outcomes and costs for a range of COVID-19 control measures in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Our objective was to inform policy decision making by projecting clinical and economic outcomes, cost-effectiveness, and budget impact of alternative control strategies, focusing on those proposed or currently in use in South Africa.

METHODS {#S6}
=======

Analytic Overview {#S7}
-----------------

We developed the Clinical and Economic Analysis of COVID Interventions (CEACOV) dynamic state-transition Monte Carlo microsimulation model to reflect the natural history, diagnosis, and treatment of COVID-19. We compared six public health intervention strategies ([figure S1](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). Common characteristics of all six strategies are: (a) testing consists of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) on a nasopharyngeal specimen; (b) those awaiting test results are instructed to self-isolate; (c) those who are severely ill (with dyspnoea and/or hypoxemia), regardless of test result, are admitted to a hospital until hospital capacity is reached; (d) those with a negative test result are advised to practice physical distancing and hand hygiene; (e) those with an initial negative test result can present for repeat testing if they develop new or worsening symptoms; (f) those not initially admitted to a hospital can be admitted later if they develop severe illness. Unique characteristics of each modelled strategy are: *Healthcare Testing (HT):* Approximately 30% of people with mild/moderate COVID-19-like symptoms and all those with severe symptoms self-present to a healthcare centre for testing. Those with a positive test result who are not severely ill are instructed to self-isolate at home.*Contact Tracing (HT+CT):* In addition to *HT,* household contacts of those with COVID-19 are tested. Those with a positive result are instructed to self-isolate at home.*Contact Tracing + Isolation Centre (HT+CT+IC):* In addition to *HT+CT,* those who have a positive test result but are not severely ill are referred to an isolation centre (IC) that offers food, shelter, and basic medical care without supplemental oxygen. They are discharged after 14 days.*Contact Tracing + Isolation Centre + Mass Symptom Screening (HT+CT+IC+MS):* In addition to *HT+CT+IC,* community healthcare workers conduct screens of the entire population for COVID-19 symptoms once every 6 months and conduct PCR testing for those with symptoms. Those who have a positive PCR result but are not severely ill and cannot safely isolate at home are referred to an IC. As a frame of reference, epidemic control measures in South Africa in June 2020 included combinations of HT, CT, IC, and MS.*Contact Tracing + Isolation Centre + Quarantine Centre (HT+CT+IC+QC):* In addition to *HT+CT+IC,* household contacts with a negative test result who cannot safely quarantine at home are referred to a quarantine centre (QC) where they receive food and shelter. They are discharged after 14 days, unless they develop COVID-19-like symptoms, in which case they are tested and referred to ICs or hospitals if they test positive, as appropriate.*Contact Tracing + Isolation Centre + Mass Symptom Screening + Quarantine Centre (HT+CT+IC+MS+QC):* This is a combination of all measures described above.

Starting with SARS-CoV-2 infection prevalence of 0·1%, we modelled COVID-19-specific outcomes over 360 days, including daily and cumulative infections (detected and undetected), deaths, resource utilization, and healthcare costs from the health sector perspective. The primary outcome was the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) -- the difference in healthcare costs (2019 US dollars \[US\$\]) divided by the difference in life-years -- between intervention strategies over a lifetime horizon, estimating that, on average, 12·9 years of life would be saved from each averted COVID-19 death ([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). Recognizing no established threshold, we judged an ICER less than \$1,290/year-of-life saved (YLS) cost-effective, based on an opportunity cost approach ([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}).^[@R9]^

Model Structure {#S8}
---------------

### Health States and Natural History {#S9}

At simulation initiation, each individual is either susceptible to, or infected with, SARS-CoV-2 according to age-stratified probabilities (0--19, 20--59, ≥60 years) ([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). Once infected, an individual first transitions to the pre-infectious latency state. Each individual faces an age- dependent probability of developing asymptomatic, mild/moderate, severe, or critical disease ([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}, [figure S2](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). Those with critical disease face daily probabilities of death. If they survive, they pass through a recuperation state (remaining infectious) before going to the recovery state. Those in other disease states can transition directly to the recovery state. "Recovered" individuals pose no risk of transmission and are assumed immune from repeat infection for the duration of the simulation. All simulated individuals advance through the model simultaneously to capture infection transmission dynamics.

### Transmission {#S10}

Individuals in asymptomatic, mild/moderate, severe, critical, or recuperation states of COVID-19 may transmit infection to susceptible individuals at state-dependent daily rates. The number of daily infections is a function of the proportion of susceptible people in the population, the distribution of disease states among those with COVID-19, and any interventions that influence transmission ([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}).

### Testing and Interventions {#S11}

For the PCR assay, we defined sensitivity, specificity, time from testing to result, and cost. Each intervention strategy can influence testing probability (e.g., CT and MS), infection transmission rate (e.g., IC and QC), and costs.

### Resource Utilization {#S12}

Individuals with severe or critical disease are referred to hospital and ICU beds, respectively. If those resources are not available at the time, the individual receives the next lower available intervention, which is associated with a different mortality risk and cost (e.g., if a person needs ICU care but there are no ICU beds available, s/he will receive non-ICU hospital care).

Model Calibration {#S13}
-----------------

We populated CEACOV with COVID-19 natural history data from published literature ([table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}). We used estimates of the basic reproduction number (R~0~) and duration of viral shedding in various disease states to calculate transmission rates. We then calibrated the transmission rates to construct an effective reproduction number (R~e~) that corresponds to estimates from the South African National Institute for Communicable Diseases in May 2020, after implementation of physical distancing and shelter-in-place policies ([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}).^[@R10]^

Input Parameters {#S14}
----------------

### Cohort Characteristics {#S15}

We defined cohort demographic characteristics using the 2019 mid-year population estimates from Statistics South Africa ([table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}).^[@R11]^ Forty-seven percent were aged 0--19 years, 44% were aged 20--59 years, and 9% were aged 60 years or older. Day 0 of the model represents a provincial prevalence of active SARS-CoV-2 infection of 0·1% (approximately 11,000 individuals with SARS-CoV-2 infection in KwaZulu-Natal), with the remainder of the population susceptible to infection.

### Natural History {#S16}

For those newly infected with SARS-CoV-2, pre-infectious latency was 2·6 days on average. [Table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"} indicates the duration of time spent in each state, the probability of developing severe or critical disease, which increased with age, and the age-dependent mortality for those with critical disease.

### Transmission {#S17}

We stratified transmission rates by disease state ([table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}). We adjusted transmission rates to reflect an R~e~ of 1·5.^[@R10]^ Given uncertainty over values of R~e~, both in the past and future, we also simulated scenarios with lower (1·2) and higher (2·6) R~e~ values ([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}).

### Testing and Interventions {#S18}

In the base case, we assumed a 70% sensitivity, 100% specificity, and five days to PCR result return and action across all active infection states.^[@R12]^ We defined the probability of undergoing testing based on health state and the intervention strategy in place ([table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}). Given limited data about the precise efficacy of each intervention for reducing SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates (e.g., IC), we made assumptions about efficacies and varied them in sensitivity analysis. In the base case, CT and MS increased detection of cases by 17% and 33%, respectively. Ongoing transmission after diagnosis was reduced by 50% from HT alone and by 95% when HT was combined with ICs or QCs ([table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}).

### Resource Utilization and Costs {#S19}

The maximum capacity of hospital and ICU beds was 26,220 and 744 per 11 million people, as reported for KwaZulu-Natal by the South African Department of Health ([table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}).^[@R13]^ In the base case, we assumed that IC and QC beds were available to all who needed them. We applied costs of PCR testing, contact tracing, and mass symptom screening, as well as daily costs of hospitalisation, ICU stay, and IC/QC stays based on published estimates and/or cost quotes obtained in KwaZulu-Natal ([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}).

Resource Utilization and Budget Impact Analysis {#S20}
-----------------------------------------------

We conducted resource utilization and budget impact analysis from a health sector perspective for KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, with a population of 11 million people. We projected the total resources, including testing, hospital/ICU beds, and IC/QC beds, that would be used in each intervention strategy. IC/QC beds are offered to those who meet criteria, and we assumed in the base case that all offered would be used. In budget impact analysis, we projected the total and component healthcare costs associated with each strategy over 360 days and compared them with the 2019 KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health budget of \$312 billion.^[@R14]^

Sensitivity Analysis {#S21}
--------------------

We conducted one-way sensitivity analysis by varying key parameters across plausible ranges to determine the impact on clinical and cost projections and policy conclusions ([table 1](#T1){ref-type="table"}). To extrapolate to other settings, we limited the availability of hospital and ICU beds to the median numbers in countries in SSA (22,275 and 371 per 11 million people).^[@R15]^ We also examined scenarios with reduced availabilities of IC/QC beds. In multi-way sensitivity analysis, we reduced the efficacies and costs of ICs/QCs to reflect the impact of home-based isolation and quarantine strategies.

RESULTS {#S22}
=======

Base Case {#S23}
---------

For an epidemic with R~e~=1·5, we projected that *HT* would result in the most COVID-19 infections and deaths, most life-years lost, and lowest costs over 360 days ([table 2](#T2){ref-type="table"}, [figures S3](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}--[S4](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). *HT+CT+IC+MS* provided the greatest clinical benefit while remaining cost-effective (ICER \$350/YLS) ([figure 1](#F1){ref-type="fig"}). *HT+CT+IC+MS* decreased life-years lost by 76% and increased costs by 16% compared with *HT. HT+CT+IC+MS+QC* yielded the fewest infections, deaths, and life- years lost, but it increased costs by 95% and was not cost-effective (ICER \$8,000/YLS) compared with *HT+CT+IC+MS. HT+CT+IC* and *HT+CT+IC+QC* resulted in more life-years lost and higher costs compared with alternative strategies.

With R~e~=1·2, *HT+CT+IC+MS* was the least costly strategy ([table 2](#T2){ref-type="table"}). *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC* resulted in fewer life-years lost but increased costs by 6·9-fold compared with *HT+CT+IC+MS. HT, HT+CT, HT+CT+IC,* and *HT+CT+IC+QC* each yielded more life-years lost and higher or similar costs compared with alternative strategies. *HT+CT+IC+MS* in the R~e~=1·2 scenario resulted in 94% fewer life-years lost and 75% lower costs compared with *HT+CT+IC+MS* in the R~e~=1·5 scenario ([table 2](#T2){ref-type="table"}, [figures S3](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}--[S4](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"})

Resource Utilization and Budget Impact Analysis {#S24}
-----------------------------------------------

With R~e~=1·5, *HT* resulted in the most cumulative PCR tests performed over 360 days and highest peak daily use of hospital beds ([table 3](#T3){ref-type="table"}). *HT+CT+IC+MS,* compared with *HT,* reduced cumulative PCR tests performed by 71% and reduced peak daily hospital bed use by 71% (due to fewer cumulative infections), while requiring 19,260 IC beds at peak daily use. Only the *HT+CT+IC+QC* and *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC* strategies maintained peak daily ICU bed demand below capacity, though these strategies required over 100,000 QC beds at peak daily use.

We projected similar patterns for an epidemic with R~e~=1·2. *HT+CT+IC+MS,* compared with *HT,* reduced cumulative PCR tests performed by 63% and reduced peak daily hospital bed use by 82%, while requiring 2,080 IC beds at peak daily use. All strategies except *HT* and *HT+CT* maintained peak daily ICU bed demand below capacity.

Over 360 days, for an epidemic with R~e~=1·5, PCR testing contributed 6--27% to overall costs in all strategies ([figure 2](#F2){ref-type="fig"}). In strategies with QCs, these centres contributed ≥68% to the overall costs. In strategies without QCs, ICU care was the largest contributor to overall costs, ranging from 51--60%. Costs exclusive of ICU care were \$285 million (*HT*), \$366 million *(HT+CT+IC+MS),* and \$1·329 billion *(HT+CT+IC+MS+QC),* reflecting approximately 9%, 12%, and 43% of the 2019 KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health budget. In relevant strategies, CT and MS together contributed \<3% and ICs contributed \<24% to overall costs. For an epidemic with R~e~=1·2, costs exclusive of ICU care were \$196 million *(HT),* \$116 million *(HT+CT+IC+MS),* and \$1·273 billion *(HT+CT+IC+MS+QC),* reflecting 6%, 4%, and 41% of the 2019 Department of Health budget.

Sensitivity Analysis {#S25}
--------------------

The patterns of results were similar to the base case in sensitivity analyses for: the costs of CT and MS ([table S1](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}) and hospitalisation ([table S2](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}); PCR sensitivity and time to result ([table S3](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}) and PCR cost ([table S4](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}); and availability of IC and QC beds ([table S5](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}) and hospital and ICU beds ([table S6](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). *HT+CT+IC+MS* remained cost-effective, while *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC* provided the greatest clinical benefit but at much higher cost that resulted in an ICER above the cost- effectiveness threshold.

Conversely, our projected ICERs changed meaningfully in a model with an R~e~ of 2·6 - resource requirements increased substantially, making *HT+CT+IC+MS* no longer cost-effective (ICER \$6,810/YLS), and *HT+CT* became the cost-effective strategy (ICER \$1,000/YLS) ([table S7](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). Similarly, when the efficacies of CT and MS to detect infections were halved from the base case values, *HT+CT+IC+MS* was no longer cost-effective (ICER \$4,340/YLS) ([table S8](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). When the efficacy of ICs for transmission reduction was decreased from 95% to 75%, the ICER of *HT+CT+IC+MS* (\$1,990/YLS) was above the cost-effectiveness threshold ([table S9](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). When the IC/QC costs decreased, *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC* became more favourable in terms of cost- effectiveness ([table S10](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}).

In a multi-way sensitivity analysis that reduced efficacies and costs of IC/QC strategies to assess lower-cost but potentially lower-efficacy home-based IC and QC programs, *HT+CT+IC+MS* remained cost-effective in most scenarios, including all scenarios in which transmission reduction remained ≥85% and costs were ≥50% of base case costs ([figure S5](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}). *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC* resulted in fewer life-years lost and lower costs than *HT+CT+IC+MS* when transmission reduction remained at 95% and QC costs were 25% of base case values.

DISCUSSION {#S26}
==========

A public health strategy combining contact tracing, isolation of those with confirmed COVID-19, and community-based mass symptom screening will substantially reduce infections, hospitalisations, and deaths and is an efficient use of healthcare resources in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. We estimate that this strategy would cost an additional \$350 per YLS, which compares favourably with the cost-effectiveness of many established public health interventions in South Africa, including tuberculosis diagnostic testing^[@R16]^ and cervical cancer screening.^[@R17]^ In a scenario of lower epidemic growth, this package of COVID-19 interventions was even more attractive due to earlier containment and prevention of downstream infections, yielding cost savings over 360 days. Although our projections suggest that quarantine centres for contacts who test negative will reduce infections and deaths further, this would require a substantial financial investment that does not meet standard cost-effective thresholds and may be unaffordable.

Our results are robust to most sensitivity analyses, reflecting generalizability to settings with resource constraints, to epidemics at varying degrees of acceleration (in line with published estimates in South Africa^[@R10],[@R18]^) -- with and without physical distancing measures in place -- and with varying costs of interventions.^[@R19]^ *HT+CT+IC+MS* generally remained cost-effective throughout most of these scenarios. A notable exception was when R~e~ was 2·6, when the epidemic outpaced the ability of these control measures, and costs increased substantially.

Our model parameters and specifications were selected for their relevance to LMICs. Our estimates are based on the population structure of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, with a median age of 27 years (compared with 38 years in the USA), and thus are likely to reflect epidemic scenarios in LMICs with similarly young age structures. We also chose intervention scenarios based on prior work supporting their efficacy for epidemic control, WHO recommendations, and particular relevance to settings with limitations in formal healthcare infrastructure.^[@R6]--[@R8]^ For example, we specified our model to reflect the number of available hospital and ICU beds in KwaZulu-Natal,^[@R13]^ and results were similar when we further restricted bed availability to that elsewhere in SSA.^[@R15]^ Contact tracing and community-based screening campaigns have been frequently used for case-finding in LMICs.^[@R20]^ Many countries in SSA are thus theoretically poised to implement such interventions through established networks of community health workers or volunteers. Finally, isolation centres, which are likely to require the greatest investment in new infrastructure, have been implemented successfully in response to Ebola epidemics in West Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where healthcare resources are among the lowest in the world.^[@R21]^

Isolation centres in our model are designed as housing facilities for people with confirmed COVID-19 who do not require hospital-level care but cannot safely isolate at home. We estimated that their use reduces ongoing transmission after a confirmed diagnosis from 50% (in the *HT* strategy) to 5%. They are likely to be most effective in areas with high population and household density and limited capacity for in-home isolation, as is the case for many urban centres in SSA. Quarantine centres, which include optional housing for contacts who test negative and cannot safely distance during the latency period, have also been proposed for interrupting epidemic spread and were implemented in the early phases of the COVID-19 response in China. They were also effective in our model at reducing the deleterious impact of the epidemic, but at a high financial cost to the health sector. At a cost of \$8,000/YLS, these quarantine centres are unlikely to be cost-effective in most publicly funded healthcare systems in LMICs.

Importantly, there are critical social and human rights considerations to implementation of both isolation and quarantine in many settings, due to trade-offs between public health benefits and civil liberties.^[@R22]^ In our model, both interventions are provided optionally for those who cannot do so safely at home, but we conservatively included costs to reflect needs should they be used. We also considered the use of home-based isolation and quarantine in a multi-way analysis that reduced efficacies and costs of both. We found that isolation remained cost-effective even in lower efficacy scenarios, but that quarantine was cost-effective only if efficacy remained extremely high (95% reduction in transmission) and costs were reduced to 25% of the base case values. On balance, our findings do not support use of quarantine centres in areas without significant resources, public support for their use, or an intervention design that allows high efficacy with minimal costs.

Our model should be interpreted within the context of several limitations. We did not account for heterogenous mixing within the population. Instead, we assumed that contact patterns were random, as is commonly done in infectious disease models. We assumed that age is the primary determinant of COVID-19 disease progression as demonstrated in multiple settings.^[@R23],[@R24]^ We did not specify prevalence of co-morbidities or their age-independent effect on COVID-19 outcomes. Currently, there are limited data about a modifying effect of HIV on the severity of COVID-19.^[@R25]^ In the absence of data, we assumed that risks of COVID-19 and outcomes for people with HIV are similar to those of others in their age group. It will be crucial to consider how resources and interventions implemented in response to COVID-19 stand to impact available resources for other regional healthcare priorities. In our projections of lifetime ICER, we did not include lifetime costs of healthcare beyond COVID-19, but prior studies have estimated expenditures of South Africa's healthcare sector to be approximately \$600 annually per capita, not including HIV care costs.^[@R26]^ As with all modelling exercises, our estimates are determined by assumptions of input parameters. We selected COVID-19 clinical parameters based on the published literature, which are largely derived from high-income settings. Intervention efficacy estimates were hypothesized based on other model parameters, existing literature where available, or expert opinion if no data were available. Recognizing a lack of empiric data for some of these estimates, we focused our sensitivity analyses on varying these estimates to assess their influence on the results. Finally, costing data were derived from the literature and direct cost estimates from local suppliers in KwaZulu-Natal and therefore might not reflect costs in other contexts. Nonetheless, our primary findings and policy conclusions were largely consistent across a range of costing estimates.

We report results from a model-based cost-effectiveness analysis, demonstrating that a combination of contact tracing, isolation of those with confirmed COVID-19, and mass symptom screening is likely to limit the size of the COVID-19 epidemic in South Africa and would be cost- effective from a healthcare sector perspective. We recommend that policymakers consider this combination of interventions to address COVID-19 epidemic control efficiently.
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![Cost-effectiveness efficiency frontier: COVID-19 intervention strategies in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.\
COVID-19: coronavirus disease 2019. HT: healthcare testing. CT: contact tracing within households. IC: isolation centre. MS: mass symptom screen. QC: quarantine centre.\
Model results are shown for an effective reproduction number of 1·5. Strategies that are below the line are dominated -- i.e. an inefficient use of resources compared with other strategies. For all other strategies, ICERs are shown below the strategy label.](nihpp-2020.06.29.20140111-f0001){#F1}

![Budget impact analysis: contributors to healthcare costs of COVID-19 intervention strategies in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.\
SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. COVID-19: coronavirus disease 2019. R~e~: effective reproduction number. HT: healthcare testing. CT: contact tracing within households. IC: isolation centre. MS: mass symptom screen. QC: quarantine centre.\
Panel A shows results for an epidemic with R~e~=1·5, and Panel B shows results for an epidemic with R~e~=1·2. The figures show the total and component COVID-19-related healthcare costs, from a health sector perspective, associated with different intervention strategies when applied to the entire KwaZulu-Natal population of 11 million people. The costs are derived from model-generated results. Percentages in parentheses represent the proportion of the 2019 KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health budget.](nihpp-2020.06.29.20140111-f0002){#F2}

###### 

Input parameters for a model-based analysis of COVID-19 intervention strategies in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

  Parameter                                                                                        Value (Range)                       Source                                                                          
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------- ----------- --------- --------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------
  **Cohort Characteristics**                                                                                                                                                                                           
   Age distribution, %                                                                                                                 11                                                                              
    0--19y                                                                                         47                                                                                                                  
    20--59y                                                                                        44                                                                                                                  
    ≥60y                                                                                           9                                                                                                                   
  **Natural History**                                                                                                                                                                                                  
   Proportion in each health state at model start, %                                                                                   Asm.                                                                            
    Susceptible                                                                                    99.900                                                                                                              
    Infected                                                                                                                                                                                                           
     Pre-infectious latency                                                                        0·030                                                                                                               
     Asymptomatic                                                                                  0·030                                                                                                               
     Mild/moderate disease                                                                         0·030                                                                                                               
     Severe disease                                                                                0·005                                                                                                               
     Critical disease                                                                              0·005                                                                                                               
    Recuperation after critical disease                                                            0·000                                                                                                               
    Recovered                                                                                      0·000                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   Disease path probability[\*](#TFN3){ref-type="table-fn"}, stratified by age, %                  Asymp.                              Mild/Mod.   Severe    Critical                                                  See [Appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
    0--19y                                                                                         52·39                               47·10       0·50      0·01                                                      
    20--59y                                                                                        26·20                               71·95       1·18      0·67                                                      
    ≥60y                                                                                           18·00                               78·79       0·09      3·12                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   Duration of health states, stratified by disease path, days                                     Asymp.                              Mild/Mod.   Severe    Critical                                                  See [Appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
    Pre-infectious latency                                                                         2·6                                 2·6         2·6       2·6                                                       
    Asymptomatic                                                                                   9·5                                 2·0         2·0       2·0                                                       
    Mild/moderate disease                                                                          \--                                 10·0        6·5       3·0                                                       
    Severe disease                                                                                 \--                                 \--         10·5      7·1                                                       
    Recuperation after critical disease                                                            \--                                 \--         \--       11·9                                                      
    Recuperation after critical disease                                                            \--                                 \--         \--       5·7                                                       
   Mortality probability among those with criticai COVID-19 disease, stratified by age, daily, %   0--19y                              20--59y     ≥60y      See [Appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
    Without hospital care                                                                          11·7500                             16·6200     20·3300                                                             
    With hospital care                                                                             0·0006                              3·8000      5·0000                                                              
  **Transmission**                                                                                                                                                                                                     
   Probability of onward transmission, daily, stratified by health state                                                                                     See [Appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}   
    Asymptomatic                                                                                   0·2394                                                                                                              
    Mild/moderate disease                                                                          0·1948                                                                                                              
    Severe disease                                                                                 0·0135                                                                                                              
    Critical disease                                                                               0·0107                                                                                                              
    Recuperation after critical disease                                                            0·0135                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   Effective reproductive number (R~e~, range)                                                     15 (12--26)                         10                                                                              
  **PCR Testing**                                                                                                                                                                                                      
   Sensitivity^[†](#TFN4){ref-type="table-fn"}^, nasopharyngeal specimen, % (range)                70 (50--90)                         27,28                                                                           
   Specificity, nasopharyngeal specimen, %                                                         100                                 Asm.                                                                            
   Cost, 2019 US\$ (range)                                                                         26 (13--52)                         AHRI                                                                            
   Time to result return and action, days (range)                                                  5 (1--7)                            AHRI                                                                            
  **Resource Utilization**                                                                                                                                                                                             
   Resources available per 11,000,000 people, n                                                                                                                                                                        
    Hospital beds                                                                                  26,220                              13                                                                              
    ICU beds                                                                                       744                                 13                                                                              
    Isolation centre beds                                                                          As needed, no capacity limitation   Asm.                                                                            
    Quarantine centre beds                                                                         As needed, no capacity limitation   Asm.                                                                            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   Cost, per person, 2019 US\$ (range)                                                                                                                                                                                 
    Hospital bed, daily                                                                            165 (83--330)                       29                                                                              
    ICU bed, daily                                                                                 2,059 (1,030--4,118)                30                                                                              
    Contact tracing/mass symptom screen, per instance                                              3 (2--6)                            AHRI                                                                            
    Isolation centre bed, daily                                                                    44 (22--88)                         AHRI                                                                            
    Quarantine centre bed, daily                                                                   37 (19--74)                         AHRI                                                                            

COVID-19: coronavirus disease 2019. y: years. Asm.: assumption. Mod.: moderate. PCR: polymerase chain reaction. US\$: UnitedStates dollars. ICU: intensive care unit. AHRI: Africa Health Research Institute (KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa; personalcommunication). HT: healthcare testing. CT: contact tracing within households. IC: isolation centre. MS: mass symptom screen. QC:quarantine centre.

Ranges, in parentheses, are those evaluated in sensitivity analysis.

Disease path probability refers to the likelihood that an individual, once infected with SARS-CoV-2, will eventually progress to thespecified COVID-19 disease state.

Test sensitivity does not vary by disease stage, except that is 0% in the pre-infectious latency phase.

###### 

Model-projected life-years lost, healthcare costs, and cost-effectiveness ofCOVID-19 intervention strategies in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

  Effective reproduction number (R~e~)   Strategy           Total life-years lost,[\*](#TFN6){ref-type="table-fn"} n   Healthcare costs over 360 days, US\$^[†](#TFN7){ref-type="table-fn"}^   ICER, US\$/YLS^[‡](#TFN8){ref-type="table-fn"}^
  -------------------------------------- ------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------
                                         *HT*               487,290                                                    668,000,000                                                             \--
                                         *HT+CT*            320,760                                                    704,000,000                                                             220
  1·5                                    *HT+CT+IC+MS*      116,220                                                    776,000,000                                                             350
  *HT+CT+IC*                             152,760            798,000,000                                                dominated                                                               
                                         *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC*   24,340                                                     1,511,000,000                                                           8,000
                                         *HT+CT+IC+QC*      32,070                                                     1,569,000,000                                                           dominated
                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                         *HT+CT+IC+MS*      7,100                                                      190,000,000                                                             \--
                                         *HT+CT+IC*         14,190                                                     238,000,000                                                             dominated
  1·2                                    *HT+CT*            55,480                                                     502,000,000                                                             dominated
                                         *HT*               268,900                                                    625,000,000                                                             dominated
                                         *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC*   3,260                                                      1,318,000,000                                                           294,320
                                         *HT+CT+IC+QC*      4,830                                                      1,318,000,000                                                           dominated

Strategies are listed in order of ascending costs, per convention of cost-effectiveness analysis. Thecost-effective strategy, *HT+CT+IC+MS*, is highlighted in light grey in each R~e~ scenario.

We assumed that each death results in 129 life-years lost, on average, based on our derivation([appendix](#SD1){ref-type="supplementary-material"}).

This reflects costs to the healthcare sector.

The ICER is the difference between two strategies in costs divided by the difference in life-years. Weconsidered a strategy cost-effective if its ICER was less than US\$1,290/YLS.^[@R9]^

###### 

Model-projected resource utilization of COVID-19 intervention strategies in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa.

                                  Cumulative PCR tests performed over 360 days, n   Peak daily resource use, n                             
  ------------ ------------------ ------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------- ------- -------- -------- ---------
               *HT*               6,797,070                                         62,810                       5,610   744      \--      \--
               *HT+CT*            6,461,580                                         35,920                       3,670   744      \--      \--
  1·5          *HT+CT+IC+MS*      4,867,750                                         18,210                       1,620   744      19,260   \--
  *HT+CT+IC*   4,955,220          20,100                                            2,020                        744     21,860   \--      
               *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC*   3,388,490                                         11,270                       450     440      11,450   102,710
               *HT+CT+IC+QC*      3,376,070                                         11,230                       680     545      15,310   103,150
                                                                                                                                           
               *HT+CT+IC+MS*      3,000,180                                         10,410                       480     530      2,080    \--
               *HT+CT+IC*         3,001,420                                         10,790                       530     530      2,660    \--
  1·2          *HT+CT*            3,924,440                                         13,350                       1,060   744      \--      \--
  *HT*         4,612,870          28,110                                            2,700                        744     \--      \--      
               *HT+CT+IC+MS+QC*   2,846,140                                         10,410                       470     530      1,540    104,120
               *HT+CT+IC+QC*      2,648,640                                         9,790                        480     530      1,680    105,710

COVID-19: coronavirus disease 2019. PCR: polymerase chain reaction. ICU: intensive care unit. HT: healthcare testing. CT: contacttracing within households. IC: isolation centre. MS: mass symptom screen. QC: quarantine centre.

Strategies are listed in order of ascending costs as indicated in [table 2](#T2){ref-type="table"}, per convention of cost-effectiveness analysis. The cost-effective strategy, *HT+CT+IC+MS*, is highlighted in light grey in each R~e~ scenario.

The total number of available ICU beds was 744.
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